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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROSIE LEON, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
SUSAN PHILLIPS, 
Respondent. 
Civil No.: 870226 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT SUSAN PHILLIPS 
JURISDICTION 
This appeal was originally filed pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(1). It was transferred to this Court 
under the pour-over provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(h). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE BELOW 
A jury trial was concluded in this matter on February 
9, 1987. Special interrogatories were submitted to the 
jury. The first question pertained to the defendant's 
liability. The jury determined defendant Susan Phillips was 
not negligent, therefore, pursuant to the instructions, it did 
not answer any further questions. A judgment for the defendant 
was entered on March 3, 1987. 
The plaintiff filed a Motion for a New Trial. This 
Motion was denied by the trial court on May 6, 1987. A Notice 
of Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court was then filed on June 18, 
1987. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did Judge Cornaby arbitrarily and 
capriciously abuse his discretion by denying the plaintiffs1 
motion for a continuance so she could locate and present an 
additional witness? 
2. If Judge Cornaby was in error in denying 
the plaintiff's Motion for a Continuance, was this error 
harmless or was it a prejudicial error? 
3. Did the plaintiff adequately make a proffer 
of evidence as to the expected testimony from the witness who 
Judge Cornaby ruled could not testify at trial, so that this 
Court could adequately review this issue on appeal? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The following statutes and rules of civil procedure 
may be controlling and determinative of this issue: 
a. Rule 61 - Harmless Error. 
No error in either the admission or the 
exclusion of evidence, and no error or defect in any 
ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the 
court or by any of the parties, is ground for 
granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a 
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judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action 
appears to the court inconsistent with substantial 
justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding 
must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding 
which does not affect the substantial rights of the 
parties. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. 
Nature of the Case 
The plaintiff-appellant Rosie Leon filed this 
action for personal injuries she allegedly incurred in an 
automobile accident on September 3, 1983. Mrs. Leon named 
Susan Phillips as a defendant. Susan Phillips filed an Answer 
denying all liability for the accident. 
On October 17, 1986, defendant Phillips1 counsel of 
record filed a Motion in Limine asking the Court to enter an 
order restricting the plaintiff from calling, among others, 
Allen P. Heal as a witness. This motion was based on the fact 
that Mr. Heal had not been included as a witness in the 
original pretrial order. On October 22, 1986, a jury trial was 
commenced. Immediately prior to the commencement of the trial, 
the Court granted the motion and did not allow Mr. Heal to 
testify. On the second day of the trial, witness Dr. Brian 
Burns made a reference to insurance. The court granted the 
defendant's motion for a mistrial. 
Prior to the second trial, the plaintiff's counsel 
filed an unsigned pretrial order. The order listed Mr. Heal as 
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a witness. The pretrial order stated that witness 16, 
Mr. Allen P. Heal, had 
knowledge concerning the plaintiff's lost 
income and earning capacity and that any 
future lost earning projections to be used 
by these witnesses would be disclosed at 
least five (5) days prior to the trial, if 
such information is reasonably available to 
the plaintiff, or as soon thereafter as 
such information is made available to the 
plaintiff. 
On January 13, 1987, the defendant filed a second 
motion to compel asking the Court to enter an Order compelling 
the plaintiff to produce various documents, and in addition 
asking that several witnesses, including Mr. Heal, not be 
allowed to testify. On January 28, 1987, the Court granted the 
defendant's Motion to Compel, and required the plaintiff to 
supply all appropriate information to defendant's counsel of 
record. The Court ordered that the plaintiff's witnesses, 
including Mr. Heal, would be allowed to testify, but that the 
defendant's counsel would be allowed to inquire at trial when 
the plaintiff's witnesses received various information. 
On February 5, 1987, a three-day jury trial was 
commenced. On February 9, 1987, the jurors returned a 
unanimous verdict, answering "no" to the first question: "Was 
defendant Susan Phillips negligent." According to the court's 
instructions, no further questions, including question No. 3 
pertaining to damages were answered. 
-4-
On March 2, 1987, the Court entered an Order 
dismissing the plaintiff's Motion for a Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict. A judgment for the defendant was 
entered on March 3, 1987. 
The plaintiff filed a Motion for a New Trial on March 
13, 1987. The plaintiff's Motion was based on Rule 59 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. On May 6, 1987, the Court 
denied the plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial. The plaintiff's 
Notice of Appeal was filed on June 18, 1987. 
II. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff Rosie Leon alleged in her Complaint 
that she suffered injuries when a van driven by defendant Susan 
Phillips collided with a motor home she was driving. 
(Plaintiff's Complaint, para. 2, Record p. 1.) The 
Complaint alleged that defendant Susan Phillips caused the 
collision by negligently operating her vehicle. Defendant 
Susan Phillips denied these allegations. (Defendant's Answer, 
Second Defense, para. 3, p. 6.) 
The record reflects nothing further about the 
testimony of the various witnesses regarding liability. A 
minute entry from the trial states that various witnesses were 
sworn and testified. However, it makes no further reference 
about each witness' specific testimony. (Minute Entry, p. 
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27.) The only testimony on this issue before this Court is the 
deposition of Susan Phillips, taken on February 12, 1985. 
Susan Phillips stated in that deposition that the truck she was 
driving did not hit the motor home, as she missed it by one 
foot. (Depo. of Susan Phillips, p. 10, lines 10-15.) 
The jury trial lasted three days. The plaintiff 
presented evidence the first two days. Defendant's witness, 
Nathaniel M. Nord, was sworn and testified during the 
second day. (Minute Entry, p. 218.) 
Prior to the first day of trial, a discussion was 
held in chambers regarding the testimony of several of 
plaintifffs proposed witnesses. (Affidavit of Robert G. 
Gilchrist, para. 3, p. 235.) The Court ruled at that time that 
defendant's counsel could examine plaintiff's proposed experts, 
Allen Heal and Roger Schroeder, during the first noon recess. 
Defendant's counsel interrogated Mr. Heal at that time. 
Mr. Heal indicated that he had not received sufficient 
information to prepare a report and thus would not testify. 
(Affidavit of Robert G. Gilchrist, para. 6, p. 23 6.) 
Mrs. Leon's counsel indicated at that time that he 
did not intend to call Mr. Heal as a witness. Mr. Heal said 
there was no purpose in furthering the discussion and it was 
terminated. (Affidavit of Robert G. Gilchrist, para. 7, p. 
236.) Defendant's counsel then saw Mr. Heal at a grocery 
store immediately following this discussion and Mr. Heal again 
-6-
indicated he would not be a witness. (Partial transcript, p. 
4). It was never agreed that Mr. Heal could be called out of 
order, that other witnesses would be called in Mr. Heal's 
place, or that Mr. Heal would even testify at trial. 
On the third day of trial plaintiff called as 
witnesses Mrs. Leon, Roger L. Nuttal, and Mrs. Leon on a 
re-call. (Minute Entry, p. 219.) Plaintiff's counsel then 
stated he wanted to call one last witness. The witness was 
Allen Heal, a rehabilitation specialist. Mr. Heal was not in 
the court room. (Reporter's Partial Transcript of Proceedings, 
p. 3.) 
Plaintiff's counsel stated that Mr. Heal would 
"simply describe the difference between impairments and 
disability ratings and to make a simple statement as to the 
application of that to this case." (Reporter's Partial 
Transcript, p. 3.) The Court gave the plaintiff's counsel the 
choice of either calling a witness or resting his case. 
Plaintiff's counsel then moved to have the trial continued from 
10:30 a.m., until 1:30 p.m., so he could arrange to have 
Mr. Heal present. The Court stated it would not grant a 
continuance, and reaffirmed its statement at the beginning of 
the case that when one side ran out of witnesses, they would 
have to rest or submit their case. (Reporter's Partial 
Transcript, p. 6.) 
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Mr. Heal did not appear at the trial that afternoon. 
There is no further evidence on the record reflecting 
Mr* Heal's proposed testimony. The defendant presented her 
witnesses and rested her case. 
The case was submitted to the jury. The jury 
returned a verdict finding no negligence on behalf of defendant 
Susan Phillips. Judgment was entered for the defendant and 
Motions for a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and a New 
Trial were made. Both Motions were denied and this appeal 
ensued• 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The appellant's claims on appeal should be dismissed 
for one of at least three reasons. First, Judge Cornaby's 
ruling was properly made. Judge Cornaby, the trial judge, 
had discretion in allowing continuances and in controlling the 
order of witnesses. Unless he acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously and abused his discretion, the decisions he made 
should not be overturned. Judge Cornaby did not act 
arbitrarily or capriciously, therefore his Order denying the 
plaintiff's Motion for a Continuance should be allowed to stand. 
If Judge Cornaby was in error in not granting the 
continuance, any such error was harmless. Rule 61 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure and the resulting case law hold that 
if an error does not go to the merits of an action and instead 
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is harmless and on a peripheral point, it is not grounds to 
overturn a jury verdict. The jury found the defendant had not 
acted negligently and thus it did not discuss the issue of 
damages. Mr. Heal's testimony related solely to damages. 
Therefore, his proposed testimony would not have affected the 
jury verdict, and if anything, was harmless error. 
Finally, Mr. Heal's testimony was not preserved on 
the record. The plaintiff's counsel had the duty to make a 
proffer of Mr. Healfs testimony so it could be reviewed by 
this Court. It was his obligation to show what testimony 
Mr. Heal would make and why it would affect the jury verdict. 
Mr. Heal did not appear and thus no such proffer was ever 
made. Therefore, without a record, this Court is without a 
basis to fully review this matter, and the appeal should be 
dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A 
CONTINUANCE. 
Plaintiff's appeal focuses on the trial court's 
refusal to grant her motion for a continuance so witness Alan 
Heal could testify. The request for a continuance was made in 
the morning of the third, or last day of trial. At 
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approximately 10:30 a.m. on the last day of trial, the 
plaintiff's counsel had completed his re-examination of 
plaintiff Rosie Leon. Plaintiff's counsel informed the 
Court that he would like to call Alan Heal, a rehabilitation 
witness, as his last witness. However, Mr. Heal was not 
present in the courtroom. The Court instructed plaintiff's 
counsel to call his next witness immediately, or rest his 
case. Plaintiff's counsel moved the Court for a continuance so 
he could find Mr. Heal. The Court denied the motion and 
reinstated its previous ruling that plaintiff's counsel should 
call his next witness or rest his case. Plaintiff's counsel 
then rested his case. After the defendant presented her case 
the matter was submitted to the jury. 
The jury returned a verdict finding no negligence on 
behalf of the defendant. A judgement was entered in accordance 
with that verdict. The Trial Court's denial of plaintiff's 
motion for a continuance is the basis upon which this appeal 
arisese Rule 40(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
pertains to the trial court's discretion in granting or denying 
a motion for a continuance. 
Rule 40(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
states as follows: 
Upon motion of a party, the court may in 
its discretion, and upon such terms as may 
be just, including the payment of costs 
occasioned by such postponement, postpone a 
trial or proceeding upon good cause shown. 
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If the motion is made upon the ground of 
the absence of evidence, such motion shall 
also set forth the materiality of the 
evidence expected to be obtained and shall 
show that due diligence has been used to 
procure it. The court may also require the 
party seeking the continuance to state, 
upon affidavit or under oath the evidence 
he expects to obtain, and if the adverse 
party thereupon admits that such evidence 
would be given, and that it may be 
considered as actually given on the trial, 
or offered and excluded as improper, the 
trial shall not be postponed upon that 
ground. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue of the 
trial court's discretion in granting or denying a continuance 
in Miller Pontiac, Inc. v. Osborne, 622 P.2d 800 (Utah 
1981). In Miller, the defendant purchased a car for her son 
from the plaintiff. Subsequently the car developed engine 
trouble. The defendant returned the car to the plaintiff and 
stopped payment on the down payment check. The plaintiff filed 
suit for damages resulting from the lost sale. Judgment was 
entered for the plaintiff and the defendant appealed. One of 
the defendant's claims on appeal was that the district court 
erred in refusing to grant the defendant a continuance of the 
trial. The defendant's counsel moved for a continuance on the 
morning of trial as he was unable to contact his client to 
inform her of the trial date. The district court denied the 
motion as the defendant's son was at court and available to 
testify, no reason was given for the defendant's counsel's 
failure to contact his client, and no proffer of evidence was 
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made of the defendant's testimony. The supreme court held that 
the district court had complete discretion in granting or 
denying the request for a continuance, that it had not abused 
this discretion, and thus upheld the lower court's ruling. 
The trial court's discretion in granting or denying a 
continuance was also recognized in the criminal matter of 
State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220 (Utah 1985). In Williams, 
the defendant was charged and found guilty of forgery. At the 
beginning of the trial, the defense counsel moved the court for 
a continuance to procure testimony of an absent witness. The 
defense counsel advised the court that a third person had 
confessed to taking and forging the checks. He stated that the 
testimony of the third person would be relevant to the issue of 
the defendant's knowledge of whether or not the checks were 
forged. The trial court denied the request on the basis that 
the testimony that would be offered by the third person was 
speculative and unlikely to be material. The supreme court 
affirmed the trial court's decision not to grant a 
continuance. The court noted that it is well established that 
the granting of a continuance is within the discretion of the 
trial judge, and that absent an abuse of that discretion, that 
the trial court's decision will not be reversed by this Court. 
The denial of a continuance as an element within the 
trial court's discretion was also recognized by the Wyoming 
Supreme Court in Carlson v. BMW Industrial Service, Inc., 
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744 P.2d 1383 (Wyo. 1987). In Carlson, a motorcyclist 
brought suit against a truck driver for injuries he suffered in 
a collision between the motorcycle and truck. Plaintiff's 
counsel moved for a continuance as inclement weather conditions 
prohibited one of plaintiff's witness, a doctor, from attending 
the trial. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the 
Wyoming Supreme Court held that there was no abuse of 
discretion in denying plaintiff's motion. The court noted that 
since the plaintiff had failed to use due diligence in 
obtaining either deposition testimony from the witness or in 
making alternative travel arrangements that he was not entitled 
to a continuance of the trial. The court concluded by stating 
that the plaintiff had gambled on the doctor's attendance at 
trial, and thus could not complain when he received a losing 
hand. 
The situation in the case at hand is similar to those 
in Miller, Williams, and Carlson. The Plaintiff's witness, 
Mr. Heal, was not present in the courtroom to testify. The 
Plaintiff's counsel had not exerted due diligence in obtaining 
his testimony through a deposition or in some other form. 
Instead, as in Carlson, the plaintiff's counsel gambled on 
Mr. Heal's attendance at trial and ended up drawing a losing 
hand. 
Judge Cornaby had discretion to grant or deny the 
request for a continuance. He had previously stated that 
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counsel had to have their witnesses present or rest their 
case. Thus, it was not a surprise to either party when he 
confirmed this in his ruling denying the continuance. In 
addition, the plaintiff's counsel did not establish that 
Mr. Heal's testimony was crucial or that the plaintiff would 
suffer prejudice if Mr. Heal was not allowed to appear. Thus, 
since there was a basis for Judge Cornaby's ruling, he did 
not act capriciously and his ruling and denial of plaintiff's 
motion for a continuance should be affirmed. 
The principal case relied on by the plaintiff in her 
brief is Slavenburg v. Bautts, 561 P.2d 423 (Kan. 
1977). In Slavenburg, the plaintiff alleged he received 
injuries resulting from an automobile accident with the 
defendant. The defendant maintained that the plaintiff's 
injuries predated the accident. On the second day of the 
trial, the plaintiff's counsel informed the court that his next 
witness would not be available to testify until 1:30 p.m. the 
following day. The court ordered the plaintiff to present his 
evidence at 9:00 a.m. the following morning. When the witness 
did not appear at 9:00 a.m., the court announced that the 
plaintiff had rested its case. The defendant's counsel was 
instructed to proceed. The defendant's first witness, a 
medical expert, was on his way but had not yet arrived at the 
courthouse. The court then proceeded to give jury instructions 
and did not let the defendant's witness testify when he 
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appeared. A verdict was entered for the plaintiff. The 
defendant filed an appeal and claimed that the trial court 
erred in refusing to continue the trial to allow him an 
opportunity to present his witness. The Kansas Supreme Court 
reversed and remanded for a new trial on the issue of damages. 
In so doing, the court balanced the following seven factors. 
1. Counsel's diligence and effort to gain 
attendance of the witness, 
2. The reason the witness was not present, 
3. The nature of the witness's expected testimony, 
4. Whether the testimony is critical or merely 
cumulative, 
5. The amount of delay expected, 
6. The effect of the delay on the docket of the 
court, 
7. The overall injustice which might result if the 
delay were denied. 
After reviewing these factors the Kansas Supreme Court found 
that the defendant had suffered prejudice because of the 
plaintiff's counsel's actions, that the proposed testimony was 
material and not cumulative, and that therefore an injustice 
had occurred when the defendant's motion was not granted. 
The case at hand can be distinguished from 
Slavenburg for several reasons. First and foremost, 
Mr. Heal's testimony dealt solely with the issue of damages. 
In Slavenburg, the jury found negligence on part of the 
defendant which necessarily left the issue of damages to be 
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decided. Here, however, the issue of damages did not need to 
be decided and was irrelevant as the jury found no negligence 
on the part of the defendant. 
Second, when the other factors referred to in 
Slavenburg are balanced, it is apparent the plaintiff's 
motion was properly denied. Plaintiff's counsel did not 
exercise due diligence in obtaining Mr. Heal's testimony. 
The plaintiff's counsel knew the order and timing of his 
witnesses. Mr. Healfs absence was not caused by emergency or 
necessity. Therefore, he should have been in court when needed. 
The delay would have caused an additional trial day. 
Judge Cornaby stated that delaying the trial would effect and 
upset his court docket. And lastly, no injustice was done at 
the hands of the district court as the jury ruled the defendant 
had not acted negligently. Instead, substantial justice was 
accomplished as the jury made a full factual determination on 
the issue of liability. 
In conclusion, firmly established Utah law and the 
facts of this case indicate that the trial court acted 
correctly and within its discretion in denying the plaintiff's 
motion for a continuance of the trial. Therefore, the trial 
court's Order should be reaffirmed and this appeal should be 
dismissed. 
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POINT II 
SINCE THE JURY DETERMINED THERE WAS NO NEGLIGENCE 
ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT, THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DENIAL OF THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A CONTINUANCE 
WAS ONLY HARMLESS ERROR. 
Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
addresses harmless error. Rule 61 states as follows: 
No error in either the admission or the 
exclusion of evidence, and no error or 
defect in any ruling or order or in 
anything done or omitted by the court or by 
any of the parties, is grounds for granting 
a new trial or otherwise disturbing a 
judgment or order, unless refusal to take 
such action appears to the court 
inconsistent with substantial justice. The 
court at every stage of the proceeding must 
disregard any error or defect in the 
proceeding which does not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties. 
At the conclusion of the case below, a special 
verdict form was submitted to the jury. The jury found the 
defendant had not acted negligently. Pursuant to Rule 49 the 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the jury was instructed 
on the special verdict form not to answer any further questions 
if it found the defendant had not acted negligently. Since the 
jury found no negligence on the defendant, they therefore never 
discussed the issue of damages. 
The Utah Supreme Court dealt with a similar fact 
situation and the issue of harmless error in the recent case of 
King v. Ferraday, 739 P.2d 618 (Utah 1987). In King, the 
plaintiff and defendant were involved in an automobile 
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accident. The plaintiff brought suit for his alleged personal 
injuries. The jury found the defendant was not negligent, but 
found that the plaintiff was 100% at fault. There was no 
indication that the jury ever discussed damages. As grounds 
for appeal, the plaintiff argued in part, that the trial court 
erred in not submitting a jury instruction pertaining to 
damages. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held that although 
the case was ripe for appeal, that it would not consider the 
propriety of the ruling because any error in refusing to give 
the instruction was harmless. The court based its holding on 
the fact that since the jury found no negligence in the actions 
of the defendant, that the issue of damages was irrelevant. 
Hence, any error relating to the alleged damages was harmless. 
The issue of harmless error was addressed by the 
Nevada Supreme Court in Yturralde v. Barney's Club, Inc., 
87 Nev. 249, 484 P.2d 1079 (1971). In Yturralde, a woman 
was patronizing Barney's Club when she was physically struck 
by another patron who was intoxicated. The plaintiff brought 
an action for her injuries. During the trial, the plaintiff 
moved the court for a continuance so that a medical witness, 
who was in surgery at the time of trial, could appear. The 
request was denied as no offer of proof was made as to the 
doctor's testimony. In addition, the Judge based his ruling on 
the fact that he warned counsel to have witnesses available to 
avoid delay. The jury held in favor of the defendant. On 
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appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court held that because Barney's 
Club was absolved of any negligence, and the jury never reached 
the issue of damages, that the refusal to grant the continuance 
was only harmless error. 
The facts of the case at hand are similar to those in 
King v, Ferraday, supra, and Yturralde v. Barney's 
Club, supra. In the case at hand, one of the plaintiff's 
basis for this appeal was the trial court's denial of the 
plaintiff's motion for a continuance so that she could call a 
rehabilitation expert to testify on the issue of damages. As 
noted above, the instructions on the special verdict form 
stated the jury did not need to discuss the issue of damages if 
they found the defendant was not negligent, as the issue of 
damages would then be irrelevant. Therefore, substantial 
justice was accomplished as the jury made a full factual 
inquiry and found no negligence. Hence the question of damages 
was irrelevant and would have wasted the jury's time. Thus, if 
there was any error at the trial court level, it was harmless, 
and as stated in Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, is not grounds for reversal. 
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POINT III 
ALLEN HEAL'S TESTIMONY WAS NOT PROPERLY PRESERVED 
FOR THE RECORD. 
Plaintiff's appeal focuses on the trial court's 
refusal to grant a continuance so Allen Heal could testify. The 
only proffer of evidence pertaining to Mr. Heal's 
testimony is included in the reporter's partial transcript of 
proceedings. On page 3 of that transcript, plaintiff's counsel 
stated as follows: 
That witness is Allen Heal, the 
rehabilitation specialist and I have 
expressed to counsel my desire to call him 
now to simply describe the difference 
between impairments and disability ratings 
and to make a simple statement as to the 
application of that to this case. 
The plaintiff's counsel made no further proffer to the record. 
Preservation of evidence in the record is controlled 
by Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. That rule states 
as follows: 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. 
Error may not be predicated upon a 
ruling which admits or excludes 
evidence unless a substantial right of 
the party is affected, and 
. . . 
(2) Offer of proof. 
In case the ruling is one excluding 
evidence, the substance of the 
evidence was made known to the 
court by offer or was apparent from 
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the context within which questions 
were asked. 
(b) Record of offering and ruling. 
The court may add any other or further 
statement which shows the character of 
the evidence, the form in which it was 
offered, the objection made, and the 
ruling thereon. It may direct the 
making of an offer in question and 
answer form. 
The Utah Rules of Evidence are patterned after the 
Federal Rules of Civil Evidence. The notes of the Advisory 
Committee to the Federal Rules state that the purpose of rule 
103(2) "is to reproduce for an appellate court, insofar as 
possible, a true reflection of what occurred in the trial 
court. It is designed to resolve doubts as to what testimony 
the witness would have in fact given, and, in non-jury cases, 
to provide the appellate court with material for a possible 
final disposition of the case in the event of a reversal of a 
ruling which excluded evidence." Moore's Federal Practice, 
Part 2, 1988 Ed., p. 18. 
The Utah Supreme Court has had several occasions to 
apply this rule. An example of such a case is Reliable 
Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, 
380 P.2d 135 (Utah 1963). In Reliable Furniture Co., the 
Supreme Court was faced with an appellate review of a summary 
judgment the trial court had granted because of four 
depositions. Two of the depositions were not present in the 
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record, the other two were sealed. Therefore, the Supreme 
Court affirmed the summary judgment on the basis that the 
appellant had not met its burden in preserving a record which 
it could review. The court in that regard stated as follows: 
Under simple principles of appellate 
review, we cannot consider matters not in 
the record before the trial court, absence 
of which was made apparent on examinations 
of the record filed with this court. 
Id. at 136. 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled the same way in 
similar cases. See Miller Pontiac, Inc. v. Osborne, 
622 P.2d 800 (Utah 1981) (appellant's duty to reserve record on 
appeal). Courts of other jurisdictions have also ruled in this 
manner. See Muller v. City of Albuquerque, 587 P.2d 42 
(N.M. 1978) (it is appellant's duty to see that proper record 
is made for review). Collins v. Wayne Corp., 621 F.2d 777 
(5th Cir. 1980) (function and offer of proof is to inform 
the court what counsel expects to show by the excluded 
evidence, citing Weinstein's Evidence § 103(03) (1979)]. 
This appeal involves the proposed testimony of 
witness Allen Heal. The plaintiff has objected to the court's 
order that denied her a continuance so Mr. Heal could testify. 
Once the court made its ruling, the plaintiff had the burden 
under Rule 103 of preserving Mr. Heal's expected testimony in 
the record. This could have been done by a question and answer 
format out of the view of the jury, or by an extended proffer 
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statement by plaintiff's counsel. Neither of these was done. 
Instead, the plaintiff's attorney stated in one sentence that 
Mr. Heal would testify about the difference between impairments 
and disability ratings, and that this would apply to this case. 
There is nothing in the record to explain why 
impairments or disability ratings were applicable and how they 
would apply to this case. Therefore, this court is faced with 
a blank slate in regards to Mr. Heal's testimony and its 
application to this case. Since this court cannot review this 
testimony, and determine if it was relevant, the plaintiff has 
not met her burden to preserve an adequate record and this 
appeal should be dismissed. 
The plaintiff has alleged in Point I of her agreement 
that Mr. Heal's testimony would be relevant to the issue of 
liability. She alleges that Mr. Heal's testimony would have 
shown she was injured and thus that the defendant acted 
negligently to cause the alleged collision. 
The plaintiff's argument is an attempt to argue 
indirectly that the finding of no negligence on behalf of the 
defendant is unsupported by the evidence. She attempts to do 
so by stating only that Mr. Heal's testimony would have 
supported her position. 
If the plaintiff wishes to attack the jury's 
findings, she has the burden under Rule 11(e) of the Rules of 
the Court of Appeals to include in the record a transcript of 
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all evidence relevant to such findings or conclusions. This 
has not been done. Thus the issue of the correctness of the 
juryfs findings should not be addressed by this Court. 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that 
where it is reviewing the correctness of a verdict, that it 
will review the record in the light most favorable to the 
prevailing party, and then will refrain from disturbing the 
ruling if it is substantially supported by the record. In 
Charlton v. Hackett, 360 P.2d 176 (Utah 1961), the Supreme 
Court stated the cardinal rules of appellate review as follows: 
1. To indulge them (findings and judgment of the 
trial court) with a presumption of validity and 
correctness; 
2. To require the appellant to sustain the 
burden of showing error; 
3. To review the record in the light most 
favorable to them; and 
4. Not to disturb them if they find substantial 
support in the evidence. 
Id. at 176. 
The Utah Supreme Court has followed these rules in 
numerous decisions. See Petty v. Gindy Manufacturing 
Corp., 404 P.2d 30 (Utah 1965) (judgment at trial court is 
presumptively correct and burden to show grounds for reversal 
is upon appellant. The Supreme Court reviews the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the findings.) Hutcheson v. 
Gleave, 632 P.2d 815 (Utah 1981) (rule of appellate review 
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requires presumption of validity and review of evidence in 
light most favorable to supporting findings.) (Searle v. 
Searle# 522 P.2d 697 (Utah 1974) (actions at trial court are 
indulged with presumption of validity and burden is upon 
appellant to prove a basis for reversal.) 
The only evidence on the record before this court 
pertaining to the issue of liability are the defendant's 
statements in her depositions. She stated that her vehicle did 
not strike the plaintiff's vehicle. These statements must be 
viewed in the light that is most favorable to the defendant. 
When these statements are viewed in this light, and as they are 
not contradicted by any other evidence on the appellate record, 
the plaintiff cannot show that the findings were not supported 
by the record. Thus, since the finding of no negligence was 
supported by the record at hand, this Court should not overturn 
it on this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, there is no reason for this Court to 
overturn the trial court's ruling. The plaintiff had her 
day in court and a chance to present all evidence on the 
liability issues. The jury then decided that this accident was 
not caused by the defendant. 
The plaintiff is now complaining in this appeal that 
the trial court erred in not granting her a continuance during 
-25-
the trial. The trial court did not act arbitrarily or 
capriciously in denying this motion based on the circumstances 
before it. It was not faced with an unsuspected surprise or 
condition caused by something that counsel could not prevent or 
correct. 
Even if this ruling was in error, it was not 
prejudicial, but merely harmless error. The testimony of 
Mr. Heal went to the issue of damages. The jury never had to 
address this issue. Thus, his testimony would have been 
irrelevant. 
Finally, the record does not properly record 
Mr. Heal's proposed testimony. Thus, this Court cannot review 
how it pertains to the issues at hand. Therefore, for this and 
the foregoing reasons, the respondent/defendant Susan Phillips 
respectfully requests that this Court find that there was no 
error committed during the trial of this matter, and therefore 
affirm the jury verdict and resulting judgment of the trial 
court. 
DATED this /6^ day of T T l ^ ^ , 1988. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
^ ^ ^ j ^ ^ 
Robert G. Gilchrist 
Attorney for Respondent 
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